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Why are Bismarckian social security systems associated with larger public
pension expenditures, a smaller fraction of private pension and lower income in-
equality than Beveridgean systems? These facts are puzzling for political economy
theories of social security which predict that Beveridgean systems, involving intra-
generational redistribution, should enjoy larger support among low-income people
and thus be larger. This paper explains these features in a bidimensional political
economy model. In an economy with three income groups, low-income support a
large, redistributive system; middle-income favor an earning-related system, while
high-income oppose any public system, since they have access to a superior sav-
ing technology, a private system. We show that, if income inequality is large, the
voting majority of high-income and low-income supports a (small) Beveridgean
system, and a large private pillar arises; the opposite occurs with low inequal-
ity. Additionally, when the capital market provides higher returns, a Beveridgean
system is more likely to emerge.
Keywords: Political economy; public versus private social security; pensions
systems across european countries; income inequality, structure-induced equilib-
rium.
JEL Classiﬁcation: H53, H55, D72.
21. Introduction
All developed countries have a Social Security system. However, the size of the
social security systems varies across countries: in 1995, they absorbed 4.5% of
GDP in the US, 5.54% in the Netherlands, 4.6% in the United Kingdom and 9%
in Italy, 7.5% in France and over 7% in Germany.
There are also many diﬀerent features in the design of social security systems.
Focusing on European countries, Italy, France and Germany have very high re-
placement rates at all levels of income, while the UK and the Dutch systems
provide lower replacement rates for higher earners than for lower earners (see
Disney and Johnson 2001). This implies that the former countries have a social
security system which does not redistribute within cohort, while the latter ones
appear to be quite redistributive. In other words, the former countries are of a
“Bismarckian” type (there is a tight link between contributions and beneﬁts, and
thus low redistribution) and the latter are “Beveridgean” (beneﬁts are quite ﬂat
and contributions are proportional to earnings, thus redistribution is large).
Since the “Bismarckian” systems have typically a larger size, a puzzle arises.
Political economy theories of social security (see Galasso and Profeta 2002 for
a review) suggest that Beveridgean systems, involving intragenerational redistri-
bution, should enjoy larger support among low income people than Bismarckian
ones, which do not entail any intragenerational redistribution, and should thus be
larger.
Previous contributions to solve this puzzle in the literature of political economy
models of social security are Casamatta, Cremer and Pestieau (1999), Cremer
and Pestieau (1998) and Pestieau (1999). However, they analyze the eﬀect of the
design of the beneﬁt formula (Bismarckian versus Beveridgean) on the optimal
size of the social security system, without explaining why a Bismarckian or a
Beveridgean system with the features that we observe may arise, or they focus on
the implications of the diﬀerent systems for labor mobility across countries.
The aim of this paper is to provide a positive theory of the redistributive
3design of the social security systems which accounts for many of the diﬀerent
characteristics of the alternative systems, such as the beneﬁtf o r m u l a( B i s m a r c k i a n
or Beveridgean), the size and relevance of the second pillar.
We ﬁrst perform an empirical analysis based on the data of the European Com-
mission Household Panel (1993-1996) to conﬁrm the existence of such a puzzle.
We divide the total population in three income groups of equal size and construct
a “Beveridgean” index as the average of the diﬀerences in the replacement rates
for people of diﬀerent levels of income. As expected, countries that show higher
values of this index (such as the UK) are associated with lower public pension
expenditures, than countries that are more Bismarckian (Italy, France).
To explain this puzzle we develop a bidimensional political economy model.
In our overlapping generations model, there exist three income groups, with dif-
ferent access to the capital market: low income people face a lower interest rate
than middle income people, who in turn face a lower interest rate than high in-
come people. People vote contemporaneously on two dimensions of the social
security system: the pension level of the low income group, and the degree of
intragenerational transfer in the beneﬁt formula. The latter feature is captured
by a Bismarckian factor, α, which represents the part of the pension depending
on the average earnings rather than on each individual’s earning. It is well known
that in a multidimensional issue space Nash equilibrium of a majoritarian vot-
ing game may fail to exist. The literature provides diﬀerent alternatives to solve
this problem: structure induced equilibrium, probabilistic voting, veto power or
legislative bargaining and lobbying (see Persson and Tabellini, 2000). In this pa-
per we use the concept of structural induced equilibrium (as in Conde Ruiz and
Galasso 1999, 2000). We show that low income people support a large, highly re-
distributive system (Beveridgean); middle income people favor an earning-related
system (Bismarckian), while high income people oppose any public social security
system, since they have access to a superior saving technology, e.g. a private
system. Thus, aggregating preferences, the following equilibrium of the voting
4game arises. If income inequality is large, high income individuals join the low
income people in a voting majority that supports a Beveridgean system, with a
high level of pension for the low income individuals. The overall size of the system
is however small, and a large private pillar arises. If income inequality is small,
middle income people represents a majority which sustains a Bismarckian system,
with a lower level of the pension for the low income people, and a larger size of
the system. This leads to a smaller size of the private pillar.
These predictions are ﬁnally empirically tested. First, our calculations on
ECHP data show that Beveridgean social security systems tend to guarantee
higher replacement rates to low income individuals than Bismarckian ones. Sec-
ond, we report data from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank
(2000) to show that countries with Bismarckian systems have lower income in-
equality than Beveridgean ones. Third, we gather additional empirical evidence
to show, as expected, that Bismarckian social security systems are typically asso-
ciated with a smaller fraction of private pension (second pillar) than Beveridgean
ones. In fact, the existence of a large public PAYG system leaves a limited space
to the development of the second pillar. The majority of the elderly rely uniquely
on the public pension, but the high replacement rates guarantee them a standard
of living almost equal to the one they had during their working life, and thus
reduces the need of complementary private pensions. Moreover, Beveridgean sys-
tems are typically associated with higher returns from the private pensions in the
capital market.
The paper is organized as follows: the next section provides an empirical
assessment of the “puzzle”. The following sections introduce the economic en-
vironment, the voting game and the politico-economic equilibria. Finally, we
empirically test the predictions of the model. All proofs are in the appendix.
52. Empirical Motivations
In this section we perform an empirical analysis using data form the European
Commission Household Panel (ECHP) for years from 1993 to 1996 (4 waves).
The ECHP provides data on personal wage-salary earnings and pensions, to-
gether with many personal informations for a sample of individuals in the follow-
ing European countries: Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France,
United Kingdom, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Austria, Finland and
Sweden1. For each country, we merge the data of two successive waves and calcu-
late the replacement rates, deﬁned as the ratio of post-retirement pension beneﬁts
to pre-retirement earnings. Similarly to Nicoletti and Peracchi (2001, 2002) the
replacement rates are calculated by using the four waves of the ECHP and the
subsample of people aged 55-69 at the time of retirement2. The data contain the
information on self-reported main activity status in each month, with retirement
being one of the alternative activity status. This information allows us to select
the individuals who retired in any month between February 1993 and December
1996. For people who retired in year t (t=1993, 1994, 1995, 1996), the replacement
rate is computed as the ratio of monthly pension beneﬁts in year t (annual pen-
sion income in year t divided by the number of months during which the person
was retired) and monthly earnings in year t − 1 (annual earnings divided by 12).
Pension income only includes old-age pensions, and earnings are the wage and
salary earnings, net of taxes and social security contributions (with the exception
of France, where income is gross3). The replacement rates for the Netherlands
and Sweden are not computed, since for Netherlands the monthly information on
1For a detailed description of the ECHP data see Peracchi (2002) and Nicoletti and Peracchi
(2001, 2002).
2We simplify their procedure, and adopt also for in t e r m e d i a t ey e a r st h es a m ew a yt oc a l c u l a t e
the replacement ratio that they use for those retired in the ﬁrst and the last year of the considered
period.
3T h eg r o s sv a l u ei nF r a n c ed o e sn o ta ﬀect the replacement rate, as long as the ratio between
net and gross earnings is equal to the ratio between net and gross pension beneﬁts, as explained
by Nicoletti and Peracchi (2002).
6activity status is not available, and for Sweden the ﬁr s ta v a i l a b l ed a t aa r et h eo n e s
of 1996 and we thus still do not have any longitudinal information in the 4 waves
available to us. Pooling for each country the replacement rates for individuals
retiring at any month in the considered period, our sample sizes are still quite
small, ranging from a maximum of 336 observations in Italy to a minimum of 15
observations in Finland.
We then divide these observations in three income groups, taking a constant
number of observations for each group and calculate the median4 replacement
rate for each income group. How the replacement rates vary across income groups
depends on the country. We thus construct a “Beveridgean” index as the average
between the diﬀerences of the replacement rates by income groups (diﬀerence
between the replacement rate of the low and the middle income, the middle and
the high, the low and the high). Table 1 shows the results. As expected, the UK
and Luxembourg have a higher Beveridgean index, followed by Denmark, while
France, Italy and Spain show lower values, and they are thus more Bismarckian.
Table 2 shows OECD data on the evolution of pension expenditures in Euro-
pean Countries (as % of GDP). The United Kingdom, Luxembourg, Netherlands
and Belgium enjoy lower pension expenditures than Italy, France and Spain. Com-
paring tables 1 and 2, and having in mind that Netherlands are usually believed
to have a Beveridgean system (see Disney and Johnson 2001), it appears that
more Beveridgean countries are typically associated with lower public pension
expenditures than Bismarckian ones.
This evidence raises the puzzle and motivate our following analysis: why are
Bismarckian systems associated with larger public pension expenditures? Accord-
ing to the political economy literature on social security, we should expect that
Beveridgean systems are supported also by low-income individuals and should
thus be larger. What are the additional characteristics of the systems which may
drive this apparently “puzzling” result?
4The median is less aﬀected than the mean by the existence of atypical data. Notice that
Nicoletti and Peracchi (2001, 2002) also use a median regression model.
73. The Economic Environment
We consider a two period overlapping generations model. Every period two gen-
erations are alive: Young and Old. Population grows at a constant rate, n>0.
There are three types of agents (j): low, middle and high ability (j = L,M,H).
T h es i z eo fe a c hg r o u pm a yd i ﬀer, and the proportions of each group are indi-
cated respectively by ρL, ρM and ρH. Each group may not be larger than 1/2:
ρj < 1/2. Their working abilities correspond to their wage, and are respectively
wL, wM and wH,w i t hwL <w M <w H.W e c a l l w the mean wage income,
w = ρLwL + ρMwM + ρHwH, which may be larger or smaller than wM.
Agents maximize a standard utility function depending only on consumption in
the two periods5. As in Casamatta, Cremer and Pestieau (2000), we assume that
the utility function has constant elasticity of substitution between consumption
in period t and period t +1equal to 1/γ,w i t hγ > 1. Young agents pay a
proportional tax, τt, on their wage income and decide to save a part of their wage
income for their old age. We assume that the three groups have diﬀerent access to
the capital market. In particular, low income people face a lower interest rate than
middle income people, who in turn face a lower interest rate than high income
people. This assumption reﬂects the imperfection in the capital market, and it
allows us to diﬀerentiate the access to the private pension pillar by income groups.
We assume that the middle income group faces an interest rate which is equal or
higher to the implicit average rate of return from the social security system, i.e.
in our case, to the population growth rate, while the low-income group faces an
interest rate which is lower than the return from the PAYG system. Therefore,
5This is a quite restrictive assumption, since we cannot analyze the trade-oﬀ between con-
sumption and leisure and the choice of retirement for elderly people. Notice that a model with
leisure would imply a distortionary eﬀect of taxes which would reinforce our results. When there
is a link between the labor history of a worker and his ﬁnal pension (Bismarckian system), the
distortion of the payroll tax on the labor-leisure decision is lower than it is when such a link
does not exist (Beveridgean system). Therefore in a model with labor-leisure decision, pensions
are less costly, in terms of deadweight loss from taxation, in a Bismarckian scheme than in a
Beveridgean one.
8an individual of ability j who save 1 euro in period t will have a return of (1+rj)
euro in period t +1 ,w i t hrL <n≤ rM <r H.
Old agents do not work6. They receive a pension transfer, whose amount could
depend on their wage, as it will be speciﬁed below. We call p
j
t the pension awarded
at time t to a j-type old agent.

















































where 0 < β ≤ 1 is a factor of time preference and γ > 1 is the coeﬃcient of
relative risk aversion, superscripts indicate the period when the agent was born
and subscripts indicate the calendar time.
Notice that the restriction on non-negative savings (s
j
t ≥ 0) rules out the
possibility of borrowing in youth against future pension payments. It is easy
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where savings are increasing in the interest rate and in disposable wage income
and decreasing in the pension transfer.
6See the previous footnote.
93.1. The Social Security System
We consider a pay as you go (PAYG) social security system, in which workers
contribute a ﬁxed proportion of their labor income to the system, and the pro-
ceedings are divided among the old. Following Pestieau (1999) we assume that
at y p e - j retired person receives a pension, p
j
t+1 w h i c hc o n s i s t so nt w op a r t s :i )
a contributory part which is directly related to individual earnings, wj; and ii)
a non-contributory part which depends on average earnings, w.T h e s y s t e m i s
a s s u m e dt ob eb a l a n c e de v e r yp e r i o d ,s ot h a tt h es u mo fa l la w a r d e dp e n s i o n si s
equal to the sum of all received contributions. Therefore, the average return from
the social security system is given by the population growth rate. These properties






j +( 1− αt+1)w
´
(3.4)
The parameter αt+1 is the Bismarckian factor, that is the fraction of pension
beneﬁts that is related to contributions. As in Casamatta, Cremer and Pestieau
(1999) we assume 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.W h e nα =1the pension scheme is contributory or
purely Bismarckian; and when α =0pension beneﬁts are uniform and the scheme
is purely redistributive or Beveridgean. For intermediate values, 0 < α < 1, due to
the combination of a proportional labor income tax and the non-contributory part,
there exist an element of within cohorts redistribution, from rich to poor, which
is higher the lower is the Bismarckian factor (the lower α). As in Tabellini (2000)
and Conde-Ruiz and Galasso (1999), this feature can be crucial in our political
game, because it may induce low ability young to support the social security
system even when the average return of pensions is lower than the average return
of private savings7, n<r L.






t =( 1+n)τtw (3.5)
7Evidence in favor of the existence of this within-cohort redistribution for the US system can
be found in Boskin et al. (1987) and Galasso (2002).
10In every period, the social security system can be characterized by a triple: the





. D i s n e ye ta l . ( 1 9 9 8 )s u g g e s tt h a tt h ep e n s i o n
level of the low-income individuals represent a key component of the redistributive
structure of the system. Thus, we decide to characterize the social security system
by the pension received by low-income individuals and by the Bismarckian factor.
Once the minimum pension and the Bismarckian factor are determined, using the
PAYG budget constraint, the tax rate is also fully characterized. In other words,
for a given pL




(1 + n)(αt+1wL +( 1− αt+1)w)
(3.6)





αt+1wM +( 1− αt+1)w
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αt+1wH +( 1− αt+1)w
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t+1, while the replacement rates (p
j
t+1/wj =( 1 + n)τt+1w/wj
∀j = L,M,H) are decreasing in labor income. On the other hand, if the system is








3.2. The Economic Equilibrium
The following deﬁnition introduces the economic equilibrium, given the values of
the social security system, which will be determined by the political game.





t=0, exogenous interest rates,










11• In every period agents solve the consumer problem, i.e., every type j young








with respect to s
j
t,
and subject to the individual budget constraints;
• The social security budget constraint is balanced every period;




















The life-time utility obtained in equilibrium by a type j young agent and the
remaining life-time utility for a type j old agent are represented respectively by

















































t is the optimal level of saving obtained at equation 3.3, τt is a function
of pL








t is a constant which does not depend on current or future values of
the social security system8.
4. The Political Institution
The size and composition of the social security system are determined through a
political process which aggregates agents’ preferences over the minimum pension,
pL ≥ 0,a n dt h eB i s m a r c k i a nf a c t o r ,α ∈ [0,1].
Since the issue space is bidimensional (pL and α), Nash equilibrium of a majori-






12(see Persson and Tabellini, 2000): probabilistic voting, lobbying, structure in-
duced equilibrium, agenda setting. We adopt a majoritarian voting system and
use the concept of structure induced equilibrium. This equilibrium concept is
based on Shepsle (1979) and it has been used in the context of political economy
models of social security by Conde-Ruiz and Galasso (1999, 2002). As in their pa-
pers, our game is intrinsically dynamic, since it describes the interaction between
successive generations of workers and retirees. We therefore use their concept
of subgame perfect structure induced equilibrium9, which reduces the game to a
dynamic issue-by-issue voting game.
Elections take place every period. All persons alive, young and old, simulta-
neously cast a ballot over the two dimensions separately, pL and α. Since every
agent has zero mass, no individual vote could aﬀect the outcome of the election.
We assume sincere voting. The two dimensions can be interpreted as two diﬀer-
ent jurisdictions. One of them has to decide over pL, and the other over α.T h e
decision is the outcome of separate votes, one over each dimensions.
First, we analyze the case of full commitment, in which voters determine the




.I no t h e rw o r d s ,
current voters can determine future policies. In the absence of a state variable,
this voting game is static, and the result in Shepsle (1979) [Theorem 3.1] can be
applied to obtain the suﬃcient conditions for a (structure induced) equilibrium to
exist. In particular, if preferences are single-peaked along every dimension of the




to be an equilibrium of the voting
game with full commitment is that pL∗ represents the outcome of a majority
voting over the jurisdiction pL, when the other dimension is ﬁxed at its level α∗,
and viceversa.10
Second, we show that the (structure induced) equilibrium outcomes of the
9See the appendix for a formal deﬁnition, and Conde-Ruiz and Galasso (2002) for a detailed
discussion.
10See Persson and Tabellini (2000) for a simple explanation of how to calculate a structure
induced equilibrium.
13game with commitment are also subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of the
voting game without commitment11. In the game with no commitment, voters
may only pin down the current values of pL and α, although they may expect
their current voting behavior to aﬀect future voters’ decisions.
We start from the case of commitment. Individuals’ votes over each dimension




, are examined issue-by-issue. Voters cast a ballot over
a constant sequence of pL, for a given constant sequence of α, and viceversa. For
each dimension, pL and α, votes are then ordered to identify the median voter,
which represents the structure induced equilibrium outcome of the voting game
with commitment. Thus, for each α, we identify the median voter for pL, and,





, represent the (structure induced) equilibrium
outcomes of the game. The results are then generalized to the game without
commitment.
4.1. Voting on the minimum pension (pL)
Regardless of the composition of the social security scheme, the elderly are net
recipients from the system. Therefore, for any value of α, they choose the pension
transfer for the low income, pL, that maximizes their pension, which is clearly the
highest possible, i.e. pL s.t. τ =1.
Today’s young individuals may be willing to vote in favor of the pension sys-
tem, and thus to bear the cost of a current transfer, if their vote will also de-
termine its future size, and thus their future beneﬁts. In the game with com-
mitment, a type-j young individual choose her vote, pL
j , by maximizing her in-




j . The following proposition summarizes the voting decision of
any young individual.
11We leave the detailed speciﬁcation of the voting game without commitment to the Appendix.





≤ (1 + n)
µ





a young type-j prefers to use only the social security technology to transfer
resources to the future (and thus chooses not to save, s
j
t =0 ), and he votes for






αwL +( 1− α)w
´
wj














> (1 + n)
µ





a young type-j prefers to use only the private saving technology to transfer re-
sources to the future (s
j
t > 0)a n dh ev o t e sf o rpL
j (α)=0 .
The intuition of the previous result is the following: if the rate of return of his
saving technology, (1 + rj), is higher that the rate of return of the social security
system in place, (1+n)(α+(1− α)w/wj), at y p e - j worker would prefer to transfer
resources to the future using the private saving technology rather than the social
security system. Thus, in this case he will prefer a zero minimum pension and
positive savings. Otherwise, he will choose a positive minimum pension and no
private savings.
Notice that the young individual’s vote depends on the structure of the social
security system: i) if the system is purely Bismarckian (α =1 ), then a young
individual type-j votes for a positive minimum pension if rj ≤ n; and ii) if the
system is purely Beveridgean (α =0 ) then a young individual type-j votes for a
positive minimum pension if wj(1 + r) < w(1 + n).
>From the previous proposition it follows that low-income individuals always
prefer the social security system to transfer resources to the future, since we have
assumed that their rate of return from private saving is lower than the return
from the PAYG system (rL <n )a n dwL < w. Hence, condition 4.1 is satisﬁed
15and low income individuals vote for a positive level of pension for themselves,
according to equation 4.2. On the other hand, high-income individuals always
prefer the private saving technology to transfer resources to the future (condition
4.3 is always satisﬁed, since rH ≥ n and wH > w) and they vote for zero minimum
pension. The voting behavior of the middle group is instead ambiguous, since it
depends on the degree of redistribution (α) and on the performance of the social
security system relative to those of the assets that they may access on the capital
market (rM versus n).
The result of the next corollary is crucial to obtain an ordering of the votes
over pL.
Corollary 4.2. If (1 + rj) ≤ (1 + n)(α +( 1− α)(w/wj)) (i.e.,s
j
t =0 ) ,t h e n
dpL
j /dwj ≥ 0.
This corollary points out that if an individual prefers to use the social security
system as a saving device, the higher is his wage, the higher is his most preferred
minimum pension. The intuition is straightforward: richer individuals want to
move more resources into the future and therefore, since they use the social se-
curity system as their only saving technology, they prefer higher pensions than
lower income agents12. This corollary thus implies that if the type-M individuals
are willing to join the low-income individuals in supporting the social security
system, they vote for higher pension than the low type young.
The following proposition identiﬁes the median voter in the jurisdiction pL for
a given level of α.





≤ (1 + n)
³
α +( 1− α)w/wM
´
al o wt y p ey o u n gi fρ
H + ρ
L ≥ (2 + n)/2(1 + n)
a middle type young if ρ
H + ρ
L < (2 + n)/2(1 + n)





> (1 + n)
³
α +( 1− α)w/wM
´
al o wt y p ey o u n gi fρ
L ≥ n/2(1 + n)
a middle type young if ρ
L <n / 2(1 + n)
This proposition suggests that, when the middle income individuals prefer
social security as a saving device (case i), their private returns being “low” (see
condition 4.1) their most preferred level of pL is larger than the one chosen by the
low-income individuals, but lower than the elderly’s. Thus, the median voter over
pL belongs to the low income type if there are enough high and low-income type
and to the middle type otherwise. If instead the middle individuals prefers the
private technology as a saving device (case ii), the identity of the median voter
depends on the size of the low-income group, because in this case the middle
individuals join the high in choosing a level of minimum pension equal to zero.
Therefore we have two scenarios. When the median voter is a low type, pL is
positive and the middle and high type complement the resources they transfer
to the future through private savings; and when the median voter is a middle
type, there are no pensions and all resource transfers to the future occurr through
private savings.
4.2. Voting on the Bismarckian factor
The old have again a simple choice. Since they are no longer required to contribute
to the system, they vote for the Bismarckian factor that maximizes their current
transfer for a given level of pL. Clearly, low type old are indiﬀerent on this
dimension, because their ﬁnal pension, pL,i sﬁxed. Middle and high income old
vote for α =1(a purely bismarckian system), since, for a given minimum pension,








(αwL +( 1− α)w)
2p
L > 0; j = M,H (4.4)
We now turn to the young. Because of the assumption of commitment over the
social security policies, the voting decision of an ability type j young individual
17amounts to maximizing her indirect utility (eq. 3.8) with respect to current and
future bismarckian factors, αt = αt+1 = α, for a given value of current and
future minimum pensions, pL
t = pL
t+1 = pL. To appreciate the voting behavior of
the young, notice that, for a given value of pL,a ni n c r e a s ei nt h eB i s m a r c k i a n
factor has a double eﬀect: it raises the pensions to the middle and high types (see
equation 3.7), and hence it increases the tax rate to ﬁnance the additional pension
transfers (see equation 3.6). The next proposition provides a characterization of
this voting behavior.
Proposition 4.4. A low-type individual chooses a purely Beveridgean system
(α =0 ). A type-j individual, with j = M,H,v o t ef o rα =0if (1 + rj) ≥
(1 + n) w
wj
(wj−wL)
(w−wL) and for α =1if (1 + rj) < (1 + n) w
wj
(wj−wL)









(i.e., sj ≥ 0).
Low types clearly prefer a Beveridgean system, which, for a given pL, reduces
their wage bill.
High income types are net contributors in a Beveridgean system that redis-
tributes within cohorts. Nevertheless, they are willing to sustain a Beveridgean
system (α =0 ) if the return on their private assets is suﬃciently high. The intu-
ition is straightforward: a Beveridgean system reduces their pension transfer, but
also their contributions, which may more conveniently be invested in a private
asset. This represents a crucial insight of the model, and suggests that alternative
saving opportunities may be relevant in shaping the individual preferences over
the social security system. If, on the other hand, the return on private asset is
not high enough, high income savers choose a Bismarckian scheme13.
Middle-types’ voting behavior resambles the high types’ if their wage exceeds
the average wage (wM > w), despite the fact that they enjoy a lower private
13High type non-savers wish to transfer resources into the present. Thus, even for low private
returns, they may be willing to support a Beveridgean scheme in order to decrease today’s
contributions, and hence to increase today’s net income.
18return, rM <r H. On the other hand, for wM < w,( a n drM ≥ n), the middle
types always prefer a Beveridgean system, from which they are net recipients.
It is worth noticing that, as long as the old do not constitute a majority
of voters, the maximum level of low type pension that may be voted, pL
M (see
equation 4.2 and corollary 4.2), is consistent with the middle (and high) type
having non negative savings. Thus, the conditions in the previous proposition
completely characterize the voting behavior of the middle (and high) type over α,
for any possible pL∗.
In what follows, we concentrate on the case of high private returns for the high




≥ (1 + n) w
wH
(wH−wL)
(w−wL) , and thus
high type young support a Beveridgean system. The alternative case is analyzed
in the appendix A.6.
Using the results in the previous proposition, the median voter in the jurisdic-
tion α for a given level of pLis:


















(1 + n)+ρL/2 ≥ (2 + n)/2


















ρL/2 < (2 + n)/2
Under the assumption that high types young obtain suﬃciently high returns
on private assets, a Beveridgean system is always supported by a coalition of the
extreme: low and high types young. Thus, if they constitute a voting majority
or if they are joined by the middle-type young, a Beveridgean system arises. If,
on the other hand, they do not constitute a majority, and the middle type young
oppose a Beveridgean system, a Bismarckian system arises.
194.3. The Political Economy Equilibrium
The previous sections have separately analyzed the voting behavior of all individ-
uals along the two dimensions of the issue space, i.e., the minimum pension and
the bismarckian factor, under the assumption of commitment. Since preferences
are single peaked, we can now apply Shepsle’s (1979) result, and characterize the
structure induced equilibria of the game with commitment. The next proposition
characterizes the politico-economic equilibrium outcomes of our voting game.




,o ft h e
voting game with commitment, such that:






























if ρL ≥ n
2(1+n) ³
pL∗ = pM
L (0) = 0,α∗ =0
´
otherwise
















































































if ρL ≥ n
2(1+n) ³
pL∗ = pL
M (0) = 0,α∗ =0
´
otherwise
The proposition shows that a Beveridgean system will always arise when the
middle group has a wage lower than the average wage. However, the interesting
result is that even when wM ≥ w, a Beveridgean system will be an equilibrium as
long as both high and middle income groups have suﬃciently high returns from









M,H). If middle income individuals do not enjoy a high return from private
savings, but high income individuals do (case B i), a Beveridgean system will
still arise if there are enough low and high types. We interpret this condition
as the characterization of an economy with large inequality. On the other side,
a Bismarckian system arises when there exists a large share of middle types,
which we may interpret as a condition that characterizes an economy with low
inequality. In other words, when wM ≥ w and middle income individuals do
not enjoy a high return from private savings, but high income individuals do
(case B i), aggregating preferences, one equilibrium of the voting game arises: if
income inequality is large, high income groups join the low income people in a
voting majority that supports a Beveridgean system; if income inequality is small,
middle income people represents a majority which sustains a Bismarckian system.
This result delivers a testable prediction: Beveridgean systems are associated with
larger inequality than Bismarckian ones.
Additional results arise when we focus on the capital market. Interestingly,
the equilibrium system may be Bismarckian only if the interest rate for the middle









the interest rate of the middle income is higher than this threshold, the system
is Beveridgean. In other words, when the capital market is more eﬃcient and
provides higher returns, it is more likely to have a Beveridgean system. This
result delivers an additional testable prediction: a PAYG Beveridgean system is
21associated with a larger private pillar, which yields higher returns.




L(1) and τ(0) ≤ τ(1)
Corollary 4.6 shows that a Beveridgean system is associated with a higher
pension for the low-income individuals and a lower size of the PAYG system (a
lower tax rate) than a Bismarckian. The last result resolves the “puzzle”, i.e., our
bidimensional political economy model of social security explains the association
between a higher Bismarckian factor and a higher level of PAYG social security
expenditures.
Finally, what happens if we relax the assumption of commitment and consider
a game in which voters may only determine the current bismarckian factor and
minimum pension? The next proposition shows that the results in proposition 4.5
may be generalized to a game without commitment:




, which constitutes a (structure induced)
equilibrium of the voting game with commitment, is a (subgame perfect structure
induced) equilibrium of the game without commitment.
Proposition 4.7 suggests that there exists a system of punishment and rewards,
which makes the equilibrium outcome of the game with commitment a subgame
perfect equilibrium outcome of the game without commitment. The intuition is
straightforward. Old agents’ voting behavior does not depend on tomorrow’s pol-
icy and thus on the existence of commitment. Young individuals, who were in
favor of a positive social security system (either Beveridgean or Bismarkian) in
case of commitment, will now be willing to enter an “implicit contract” among
successive generations of voters to sustain the welfare state. This “implicit con-
tract” speciﬁes that, if current young support the existing welfare system, they
will be rewarded with a corresponding transfer of resources in their old age, or
they will be punished, and receive no transfers.
225. Testing the Empirical Predictions
In this section we aim at testing the following empirical predictions, implied by
the model:
1 . T h em o r e“ B i s m a r c k i a n ”as y s t e mi s ,t h el o w e ri st h ep e n s i o no ft h el o w
income people
2. The more “Bismarckian” a system is, the lower is the income inequality in
the country
3. The more “Bismarckian” a system is, the lower is the private pension pillar.
Table 3 shows that according to our calculations on the ECHP data, countries
with a higher Beveridgean index are associated with a higher replacement rate
for low-income individuals, both calculated as the replacement rate of the bottom
33% and the bottom 20%. We interpret this as evidence that more Beveridgean
systems oﬀer a higher pension to low income individuals, as suggested by our
model.14
Table 4 reports measures of inequality from the World Development Indicators,
World Bank 2000. The table shows that the Gini index is signiﬁcantly higher in
the UK (36.1) than in Italy (27.3) or France (32.7). This is due to a higher
concentration of income in the highest 20% in the UK, while the “middle” class
(second, third and fourth 20% of the distribution) is signiﬁcantly larger in Italy
(55) and France (52.6) than in the UK (50.4). These results conﬁrm our second
prediction.
Table 5 reports measures of the extension of the second pillar in the European
countries according to the data reported by the Green Paper of the European
Commission 1997, based on the European federation for Retirement Provision
1996. The diﬀerences are very large: in the UK pension funds assets represent
the 79.4% of the GDP and in the Netherlands the 88.5% , while in France they
only absorb the 3.4% of the GDP and in Italy an even smaller amount (1.2%).
14Notice that in our model the higher is the minimum pension, the higher is the replacement
rate of the low-type individual.
23Supplementary pensions represent the 28% of the total pension in the UK, and
only the 2% in Italy. These data are consistent with our third prediction, that the
second pillar is much more developed in Beveridgean countries, where the public
pillar is smaller, than in Bismarckian countries, where the public pension oﬀers
very large amounts.
Table 5 also shows that the ﬁnancial markets have a relevant role in the type of
system: in the UK the average nominal rate of return from pension funds is 15.5,
which is the highest value for the available countries, and market capitalization is
149.9% of GDP, while in France it is 38.9% and in Italy only 21.7%. These results
conﬁrm that when the rate of returns of private pensions is higher, a Beveridgean
system is more likely to emerge.
6. Conclusions
This paper extends previous contributions by Casamatta, Cremer and Pestieau
(1998) and Pestieau (1999) aimed at explaining the following “puzzle”: why are
Beveridgean social security systems larger than Bismarckian ones, though they
can enjoy larger support by low-income individuals due to their redistributive
characteristic?
We collect data from the European Commission Household Panel (4 waves)
which conﬁrm that more Bismarckian systems are associated with larger pension
expenditures. Also, the data show that Beveridgean systems are characterized by
a very high level of the replacement rate of the lowest income people. This feature
motivates our model, which aims at jointly determining the level of the minimum
pension and the degree of redistribution of the pension formula (the Bismarck-
ian factor) in a bidimensional political economy approach. Other features that
diﬀerentiate Bismarckian and Beveridgean systems are explained by the model:
Bismarckian systems tend to be associated with lower inequality and with a lower
size of the private pillar. The explanation is very intuitive: in an economy with
three income groups, low-income people support a large, redistributive system;
24middle-income favor an earning-related system, while high-income people oppose
any public system, since they have access to a superior saving technology, e.g. a
private system. If income inequality is large, high and low-income people form a
voting majority which supports a (small) Beveridgean system, and a large private
pillar may arise; if income inequality is small, middle-income and elderly people
represent a majority which sustains a (large) Bismarckian system and the private
pillar turns out to be small. Additionally, we show that when capital market is
more eﬃcient and provides higher returns, it is more likely to have a Beveridgean
system.
The analysis could be extended in several ways. First, using our theoretical
framework, one may ask how reforms in the degree of redistributiveness of the
public PAYG system may aﬀect the development of the private pension schemes.
As a policy implication, the results of the model suggest that in order to reduce
their public pension expenditures, Bismarckian countries should encourage the
development of the second pillar. However, we showed that this outcome is as-
sociated with a more redistributive system, which guarantees higher replacement
rates to lower income individuals. We thus expect that recent reforms, like the
Italian reform of 1995, introducing the (notional) deﬁned contribution method,
and thus a closer link between contributions and beneﬁts, and no redistribution,
would imply a system where the role of the second pillar remains marginal. Sec-
ond, the data collected in this analysis and the predictions of the model suggest
that the pension systems in European countries diﬀer in many aspects. What
role will current policies, such as the harmonization of the pension systems in
a European context, have on the diﬀerences between european pension systems?
Do we expect european countries to react diﬀerently to current common trends,
such as the aging process? These questions suggest directions for future research.
25A. Appendix
A . 1 .T h eV o t i n gG a m ea n dt h eN o t i o no fE q u i l i b r i u m
In this appendix, we deﬁne the voting game and formalize our concept of equilib-
rium: the stationary subgame perfect structure induced equilibrium. We consider
that voters may only determine the current minimum pension and the current Bis-
marckian factor, although they may expect their vote to condition future voters’
decisions. We deﬁne the voting game with no commitment as follows.











Ht, is the sequence of social security minimum pensions and Bismarckian factor
parameters until t − 1,w h e r eHt is the set of all possible history at time t.A n
action for a type j young individual at time t is a pair of social security minimum






∈ [0,1] × [0,1],w h e r e




























A strategy for a type j young individual at time t is a mapping from the
history of the game into the action space: σ
y
t,j : ht → [0,1]×[0,1]. Analogously, a
strategy for a type j old individual at time t is σo
t,j : ht → [0,1]×[0,1].W ed e n o t e

























median of the distribution of tax rates, and the median of the distribution of the







the outcome function of the voting
game at time t. Notice that this outcome function corresponds to the structure
induced equilibrium outcome of a voting game at time t in which agents can
commit to the future policy.
The history of the game is updated according to the outcome function; at time




































, the expected pay-
















, according to equation 3.9..
Let σ
y




t,b j be the strategy proﬁle at time t for all the young individuals
except for the type b j young individual, and let σo
t|b j = σo
t/σo
t,b j be the strategy proﬁle
at time t for all the old individuals except for the type b j old individual. At time








































































are, respectively, the median among the actions over the two
parameters of the social security system played at time t and t +1 .
We can now deﬁne a stationary subgame perfect structure induced equilibrium
of the voting game as follows:






is a Stationary Subgame Perfect Structure Induced Equilibrium (SSPSIE) if the
following conditions are satisﬁed:
(i) σ is a subgame perfect equilibrium.
(ii) At every time t, the equilibrium outcome associated to σ is a Structure
Induced Equilibrium of the static game with commitment over future policy.
A . 2 .P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 . 1
Aw o r k e rt y p e - j chooses a level of pL









a sd e s c r i b e da te q u a t i o n3 . 8 . T h eﬁrst order condition of
27the previous indirect utility function with respect to pL
t+1 = pL
t = pL for a given







(αwj +( 1− α)w)
1+rj
Therefore, an individual will be in favor of a zero minimum pension if the above
condition is negative, i.e. if 1+rj > (1+n)
³





to condition 4.3. On the contrary, he will choose a positive level of the minimum
pension if 1+rj ≤ (1+n)
³




, which corresponds to equation 4.1.
If condition 4.3 holds, the implicit rate of return from private savings is higher
than the return from PAYG Social Security, while if condition 4.1 holds, the
implicit rate of return from private savings is lower than the return from PAYG
Social Security. Since savings are forced to be non negative, an individual who,
according to equation 4.3, chooses a zero pension for the low-income group (which
implies a zero pension for any group) also chooses a positive level of savings, while
an individual who, according to equation 4.1 chooses a positive level of pension for
the low income group, has zero savings. In this last case, the individual prefers to
use the social security system to transfer resources to the future rather than the
private savings, and vote for the level of the minimum pension such that s
j∗
t =0 .






αwL +( 1− α)w
´
wj








A.3. Proof of Corollary 4.2.














γ (αwj +( 1− α)w)
− 1
γ (1 − α)w
·
wj
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M > 0. By corollary 4.2, pL
M >p L
L > 0 and we know that pL
H =0 .T h e
high type and the low type young prefer a lower minimum pension than the old
and the middle type young. In this case if the low and the high types young
constitute a majority in the total population the median voter will be a low type





> (1 + n)
³
α +( 1− α) w
wM
´
,t h e npL
L >p L
M = pL
H =0 ,t h a ti s
t h eh i g ht y p ea n dt h em i d d l et y p ey o u n gp r e f e ral o w e rm i n i m u mp e n s i o nt h a n
the old and the low type young. In this case if the middle and the high types
young constitute a majority in the total population, the median voter will be a
middle type young, otherwise the median voter will be a low type young.
A.5. Proof of Proposition 4.4.






αwL +( 1− α)w
> 0





(αwL +( 1− α)wH)
2 > 0 for j = M,H
Thus, the eﬀect on the indirect utility function of a low type (see equation
3.8) of an increase in α is always negative (for a given pL) and hence they vote
for α =0 .
F o rl o wa n dh i g ht y p es a v e r s ,s∗,j > 0, by the envelop theorem, we can con-















It is easy to see that ∂Ij
∂α is negative, and hence αj =0 ,f o r(1 + rj) ≥
(1 + n) w
wj
(wj−wL)
(w−wL) ,o t h e r w i s eα =1 .N o t i c e t h a t f o r wM < w the ratio on the
29RHS of the previous inequality is less than one, and thus the inequality is always
satisﬁed, since rM ≥ n.T h i si m p l i e st h a tf o rwM < w, αM =0 .
Non-savers are at a corner solution in their saving decision, and thus the
envelop theorem does not apply. In particular, they would like to borrow against










For middle and high type non-savers, the choice of α amounts to maximize
the following expression: U(wj(1 − τ)) + βU(pj).T h u s ,w eh a v e :
pL
















Using A.1, it is easy to see that the previous FOC is always negative, and hence
αj =0 ,i f(1 + rj) ≥ (1 + n) w
wj
(wj−wL)
(w−wL) . However, now reversing the previous in-
equality does not imply that αj =1 . Therefore, in the proposition we characterize
the condition for middle and high types to vote α =1for savers only, i.e., when


















In this case, the median voter over α is:
• a middle or high type young, and α =1 ,i f(1+rM) < (1+n)w(wM −wL)/
wM(w − wL)
• a high type young, and α =1 ,i f
1−ρL
2 +( 1+n)ρH > 1+n
2
• a middle type young, and α =0 ,i f(1 + rM) > (1 + n)w(wM − wL)/
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(1 + n), the low type and the high type young vote for a purely beveridgean
system, the low type young vote always for a positive minimum pension and the
high type young vote for a zero minimum pension. We thus have to characterize
the choice of the middle young.
A) For wM < w:
The middle young always vote for α =0 , since (1 + rM) ≥ (1 + n)w(wM −





(1+n)w/wM (which is equal to condition 4.1 with α =0 ), the middle young vote
for pL




> (1+n)w/wM they vote for pL
M =0.W et h u sh a v e





≤ (1+n)w/wM, the middle type young vote for α =0and for
a pL
M >p L
L > 0. Therefore the system is always purely Beveridgean since all the
young vote for α =0 . The middle type young is the median voter in the minimum













> (1+n)w/wM, the middle type young vote for α =0and for
a pL
M =0 . Therefore the system is always again purely Beveridgean. The low type
young is the median voter in the minimum pension jurisdiction only if the coalition
of the old and the low ability constitutes a majority, i.e. (1−ρL)(1+n) ≤ (2+n)/2
where (1 −ρL)(1+n) is the size of young low and middle and 2+n is the size of
the total population .
B) For wM ≥ w:
The middle young always vote for pL
M =0 ,s i n c e(1+n)
³
α +( 1− α)w/wM
´
≤
1+n and 1+rM ≥ 1+n imply that condition 4.3 is always satisﬁed for middle
young individuals. However,


























they vote for α =0 .T h u s
we have two cases:













type young always vote for a purely Bismarckian system α =1and for zero
minimum pension. The system is Beveridgean if the low and the high young are




(1 + n) > (2 + n − ρL)/2,w h e r e
2+n−ρL is the size of total population (remember that the old low are indiﬀerent),




+ρL/2 ≥ (2 + n)/2. The median voter
over pL is a low ability young if the coalition of the old and the low ability young
constitutes a majority. Otherwise the system is Bismarckian.













young always vote for a purely Beveridgean system and for zero minimum pen-
sion. Therefore the whole young generation vote for a beveridgean system. But
the low ability young group is the median voter only if ρL ≥ n/2(1+n) like in
case Aii).
A.8. Proof of Corollary 4.6

























L (0) >p L
L (1) because wL/w<1.





























32where, if γ ≥ 1 then τ (0) ≤ τ (1).
A . 9 .P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 . 7





are also subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of the
game described in the appendix A.1.
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35Table 1: Replacement Rates Across Income Groups in European Countries
Country Germany Denmark Netherlands Belgium Luxembourg France
United 
Kingdom Ireland Italy Greece Spain Portugal Austria Finland
Low n.a. 1,2749 n.a. 0,9208 3 1,0295 2,1667 0,7084 1,0500 0,9722 1,0707 1,2177 1,0303 1,3495
Middle n.a. 0,7378 n.a. 0,7914 0,9053 0,8300 0,6140 0,6535 0,8496 0,7938 0,8686 0,7661 0,6603 1,0421
High n.a. 0,6524 n.a. 0,7143 0,8205 0,7450 0,5118 0,6043 0,7902 0,9143 0,8491 1,0000 0,7129 1,1766
(L-M)/L n.a. 0,4213 n.a. 0,1406 0,6982 0,1938 0,7166 0,0775 0,1909 0,1836 0,1887 0,3708 0,3591 0,2278
(M-H)/M n.a. 0,1157 n.a. 0,0974 0,0937 0,1024 0,1664 0,0753 0,0699 -0,1519 0,0225 -0,3052 -0,0796 -0,1291
(L-H)/L n.a. 0,4883 n.a. 0,2243 0,7265 0,2763 0,7638 0,1469 0,2475 0,0595 0,2070 0,1788 0,3081 0,1282
Beveridgean 
index n.a. 0,3418 n.a. 0,1541 0,5061 0,1908 0,5489 0,0999 0,1694 0,0304 0,1394 0,0814 0,1958 0,0756
n° obs. Low 30 25 7 64 37 21 112 35 40 50 20 5
n° obs. Middle 30 25 8 64 37 21 112 35 40 50 20 5
n° obs. High 30 25 7 64 37 20 112 34 39 50 20 5
n° obs. Total 90 75 22 192 111 62 336 104 119 150 60 15
Source: our calculations from ECHP 1993-1997Table 2: Pension Expenditures in European Countries (% of GDP)
Country Germany Denmark Netherlands Belgium Luxembourg France
United 
Kingdom Ireland Italy Greece Spain Portugal Austria Finland
1990 6,77 4,6 6,08 4,57 4,17 6,65 4,65 2,22 8,19 5,77 5,96 3,27 5,46 6,06
1991 6,98 4,69 6,02 4,77 4,55 6,95 4,91 2,18 8,34 5,88 6,13 3,44 5,56 7,02
1992 7,24 4,73 5,98 4,77 4,63 7,15 4,97 2,13 9,02 5,58 6,42 3,55 5,65 7,84
1993 7,47 4,78 5,97 4,9 4,79 7,54 4,93 1,97 9,23 5,64 6,96 3,77 5,9 7,71
1994 7,57 5,71 5,59 4,85 - 7,52 4,68 1,82 - - 7,04 3,88 5,92 7,49
1995 7,71 5,63 5,54 - - 7,59 - 1,63 - - 7,13 3,95 5,93 7,28
1996 - 5,49 5,52 - - - - 1,5 - - - 4,03 - -
Source: OECD databaseTable 3. Replacement rates for low income individuals
Germany Denmark Netherlands Belgium Luxembourg France
United 
Kingdom Ireland Italy Greece Spain Portugal Austria Finland
Replacement 
Rate bottom 
33,33% n.a. 1,2749 n.a. 0,9208 3 1,0295 2,1667 0,7084 1,0500 0,9722 1,0707 1,2177 1,0303 1,3495
n° obs. 30 25 7 64 37 21 112 35 40 50 20 5
Replacement 
Rate bottom 
20% n.a. 2,0017 n.a. 1,3171 3 1,2169 2,3067 0,7566 1,5648 1,2850 1,1567 1,4682 1,7864 1,5040
n° obs. 18 15 5 38 22 12 67 19 24 30 12 3
Source: our calculations from ECHP 1993-1997Table 4: Measures of Inequality in European Countries
Country Germany Denmark Netherlands Belgium Luxembourg France
United 
Kingdom Ireland Italy Greece Spain Portugal Austria Finland
Gini 
index 30 24,7 32,6 25 26,9 32,7 36,1 35,9 27,3 32,7 32,5 35,6 23,1 25,6
Lowest 
20% 8,2 9,6 7,3 9,5 9,4 7,2 6,6 6,7 8,7 7,5 7,5 7,3 10,4 10
II+III+IV 
20% 53,4 55,9 52,6 56 54,1 52,6 50,4 50,4 55 52,2 52,2 49,3 56,3 54,2
Highest 
20% 38,4 34,5 40,1 34,5 36,5 40,2 43 42,9 36,3 40,3 40,3 43,4 33,3 35,8
Survey 
year 1994 1992 1994 1992 1994 1995 1991 1987 1995 1993 1990 1994-95 1987 1991
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank 2000Table 5: Second pillar and financial indicators
Country Germany Denmark Netherlands Belgium Luxembourg France
United 
Kingdom Ireland Italy Greece Spain Portugal Austria Finland
Pension funds 
assets as 
%GDP (1993) 5,8 20,1 88,5 3,4 n.a. 3,4 79,4 40,1 1,2 n.a. 2,2 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Supplementary 
pension as % 
of total pension 
(1993) 11 18 32 8 na 21 28 18 2 n.a. 3 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Country Germany Denmark Netherlands Belgium Luxembourg France
United 





of Return (Real 
in parenthesis) 9,4 (7,1) 10 (6,3) 9,5 (7,7) 11,8-(8,8) n.a. n.a. 15,5 (10,2) 14 (10,3) n.a. n.a. 13,8 (7) n.a. n.a. n.a.
Market 
capitalization in 
% of GDP 
(1996) 29,6 41,8 97,8 45,9 193,4 38,9 149,9 49,7 21,7 19,7 42,3 23,7 14,3 50,7
Source: Green paper EC1997. Based on  Federation of European Stock Exchanges and European Commission
Source: Green Paper EC 1997. Based on European Federation for Retirement Provision (EFRP)-European Pension Funds 1996